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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
Case No. 20020096-CA
v.
LAURA DABLE,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals her conviction of two counts of possession or use of a
controlled substance in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2001), a
third degree felony, and Utah Code Ann. § 58-38-8(2)(e) (Supp. 2001), a class B
misdemeanor, in the First District Court, Rich County, State of Utah, the Honorable Clint
S. Judkins presiding. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(1996 & Supp. 2001).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Did the trial court correctly rule that Deputy Stacey's affidavit in support
of the request for a search warrant was based on reliable information from credible
sources?

Issue 2: Did the trial court properly find probable cause to search defendant's
home based on her arrest for possession of controlled substances, her admission that she
had purchased the drugs in Ogden and stopped at her home afterward and statements from
reliable witnesses that she had sold drugs from her home on at least two previous
occasions?
Issue 3: Was the magistrate's allegedly improper authorization of a nighttime,
"no-knock" search harmless given that the search was conducted during the day and when
defendant was not at home?
Standard of Review for All Three Issues: "'We review the factual findings
underlying the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence using
a clearly erroneous standard. We review the trial court's conclusions of law based on
these facts under a correctness standard.'" State v. McArthur, 2000 UT App 23, \ 12, 996
P.2d 555 (quoting State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 854-55 (Utah 1992)). When reviewing a
challenge to a search warrant, this Court "pay[s] great deference to the magistrate's
determination." State v. Vigh, 871 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah App. 1994). Such deference is
appropriate because "'[a] grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward
warrants' is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for searches
conducted pursuant to a warrant." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983)) (citation
omitted). "[T]he [F]ourth [Ajmendment does not require that the reviewing court conduct
a de novo review of the magistrate's probable cause determination^] [I]nstead, it requires
only that the reviewing court conclude 'that the magistrate had a substantial basis for . . .
2

[determining] that probable cause existed.'" State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah
1989) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238).
Issue 4: Assuming the trial court erred in finding the warrant sufficient, did it
nonetheless properly deny the motion to suppress because officers acted in good faith in
conducting the search?
Standard of Review: No standard of review applies because neither party
addressed this argument below and the trial court had no reason to reach it, given the
court's ruling that the search warrant was not defective.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Constitutional provisions, statutes and rules relevant to this appeal are:
U.S. Const, amend. IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-205(1) (1999)
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210(2) (1999)
The Utah statutory provisions are reproduced in Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by Information dated November 30, 2000, with possession
or use of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, a first degree felony in violation of

3

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(l) & (2)(e) (Supp. 2001), and possession of drug
paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (Supp.
2001). R. 1-2. On January 26, 2001, defendant pleaded not guilty. R. 22, 28.
Defendant waived her preliminary hearing and filed a motion to suppress evidence
seized from her trailer home. R. 25-44. After briefing and argument, the trial court denied
the motion to suppress. R. 111-13.
Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to two counts of possession or use of a
controlled substance in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2001), a
third degree felony, and Utah Code Ann. § 58-38-8(2)(e) (Supp. 2001), a class B
misdemeanor. On December 13, 2001, the court imposed suspended prison terms and
instead sentenced her to serve 30 days in jail and pay fines totaling $1,400. R. 120-21.
The jail term and fine were stayed pending appeal. R. 98, 100.
Defendant timely appealed. R. 105.

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS1
Rich County Sheriffs Deputy Dale Stacey had a hot tip. On June 6, 2000, Deputy
Stacey was contacted by Sheriffs Deputies Kim Clark and Jody Gardner of Lincoln
County, Wyoming. The Wyoming deputies relayed information from an informant ("the
Wyoming informant") who stated that Laura Dable (defendant), a resident of Randolph,
Rich County, was planning a trip to Ogden, Utah, to purchase methamphetamine and
marijuana, which she was planning to sell in Lincoln County. See Findings and Order,
R. 111 [a];2 see also search affidavit, R. 18; Deputy's Report, Addendum D.
This was not the first time Deputy Stacey had heard defendant's name in
connection with allegations of drug dealing. A little over a month earlier, Deputy Stacey

1

The factual posture of this case is unusual because defendant did not request an
evidentiary hearing or submit stipulated facts. Thus, the Statement of Facts is based on
the trial court's Findings and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence
("Findings and Order"), R. 111-113, a copy of which is attached as Addendum B; the
transcript from the argument on defendant's motion to dismiss, R. 125, a copy of which is
attached as Addendum C; the Affidavit for search warrant, dated June 7, 2000, R. 14-19
("Search affidavit"), a copy of which is attached as Addendum D; and the Rich County
Sheriffs Office Deputy Report prepared by Deputy Dale Stacey, dated November 22,
2000 ("Deputy's Report"), attached as Addendum E. The Deputy's Report is cited even
though it does not appear to be part of the record on appeal because it is clear that the
report was before the trial court when it denied the motion to suppress. See R. 125:14.
Defendant has also cited the report and attached it to her brief as Appendix H. The State
will move to supplement the record with the Deputy's Report. The facts culled from the
above sources are stated in a light most favorable to the trial court's denial of the motion
to suppress. See, e.g., State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App.1997).
2

The record in this case was numbered by hand and the second page of the court's
Findings and Order is not numbered. Because the unnumbered page is between R. 111
and R. 112, the State will refer to it as "R. 11 l[a]".
5

had interviewed a man named Threll Orton, who had been arrested in Evanston,
Wyoming, on charges of selling methamphetamine and marijuana. R. 18, 111; Deputy's
Report. Orton told Deputy Stacey that he had purchased methamphetamine from a
woman named "Laura" at her trailer home in Randolph on at least two occasions. R. 18,
111; Deputy's Report. Based on Orton's description, Deputy Stacey located the trailer
and determined that the woman Orton referred to was the defendant, Laura Dable. R. 18;
Deputy's Report.
On June 7, 2000, Deputy Clark informed Deputy Stacey that defendant had been
arrested for possession of marijuana and methamphetamine during a traffic stop in
Wyoming. R. 18, 11 l[a]; Deputy's Report. Deputy Clairk also reported that, following
her arrest, defendant admitted she had purchased the drugs in Ogden and that she had
stopped by her trailer home in Randolph before proceeding to Wyoming. R. 18, 11 l[a];
Deputy's Report.
Because defendant admitted she had stopped by her trailer home after purchasing
the drugs in Ogden, and because drugs had reportedly been sold at the trailer previously,
Deputy Stacey decided to seek a warrant to search the trailer. In his affidavit, Deputy
Stacey stated:
Threll Orton informed your affiant that he had bought
methamphetamine from Laura Dable at the trailer described in this affidavit
on at least two occasions.
On 6-7-00 I spoke with Deputies Kim Clark and Jody Gardner from
the Lincoln County sheriffs Office. They indicated that they were working
on a drug case, and that a confidential informant told them that Laura Dable
was planning on picking up some drugs in Ogden on 6-6-00 and bringing
6

them into Lincoln County to sell. On 6-7-00, Dable was stopped and her
vehicle searched. The officers located approximately 4 ounces of marijuana
and 4 grams of methamphetamine.
Dable informed the officers that she had bought the drugs in Ogden
on 6-6-00 and had stopped at her residence in Randolph for several hours
before going on up to Lincoln County. Your affiant feels there is probable
cause to believe some of the drugs bought in Ogden were left in the trailer
because there have allegedly been sales made from the trailer to people in
this county.
R. 18.
The magistrate signed the warrant authorizing search of defendant's trailer home.
Upon execution of the search warrant, officers seized marijuana and methamphetamine as
well as numerous other items that appeared to be drug paraphernalia. R. 17.
The defendant moves to suppress all the items seized from her trailer because the
search affidavit was based on "unverifiable and unreliable" factual assertions made by
'"untested and questionable informants," which facts were '"uncritically accepted" by the
magistrate in approving the search warrant. R. 38. She also claimed that the state
negligently or intentionally omitted critical information that would have affected the
magistrate's probable cause determination. Id. Defendant also complained that the
search warrant fomi was not completely filled out by the magistrate and that the
omissions improperly authorized a night-time, no-knock search. R. 55-56; 125:3.
Following briefing and oral argument, the trial court denied the motion to
suppress. The court rejected defendant's challenge to the credibility of the sources of
information in the affidavit, noting that information obtained from law enforcement
officers in the course of an investigation is presumptively reliable and sufficient to
7

support probable cause. R. 112. The court also detenriined that any defect due to the fact
that the warrant was not completely filled out was harmless error. R. 113.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: The trial court correctly ruled that the Wyoming sheriffs deputies
provided information that was presumptively reliable because it was communicated by
peace officers in the course of an investigation concerning defendant's arrest for
possession of controlled substances. Although the trial court did not reach the credibility
of the two informants—Orton and the Wyoming confidential informant—because it
determined that information provided by the Wyoming deputies was sufficient to
establish probable cause, the informants nonetheless provided credible, reliable
information which may also be relied upon by this Court in finding probable cause for the
search.
Point II: The trial court correctly found probable cause to search defendant's
trailer home. Following her arrest in Wyoming for possession of controlled substances,
defendant admitted that she had purchased the drugs in Ogden and that she had stopped at
her home before driving to Wyoming. Information from Orton and the Wyoming
informant indicated defendant was involved in the sale of drugs and that she had sold
drugs from her home. These facts provided more than enough evidence to establish a fair
probability that drugs or other relevant evidence would be found at defendant's home.
Point III: Defendant's claim that the magistrate improperly authorized a
nighttime, "no-knock" search is frivolous. Whether the search warrant improperly
8

authorized a nighttime, no-knock search is inconsequential given that the search was
actually conducted during the daytime while defendant was not home to respond to a
knock. Accordingly, any error was harmless.
Point IV: The "good faith exception" to the warrant requirement need not be
invoked here because the warrant was supported by probable cause. Nonetheless, if the
good faith exception were applied, this Court should find that the deputies who executed
the search warrant acted on a good faith belief that the warrant was properly issued by a
neutral magistrate. Thus, even if the warrant were deemed defective, the evidence need
not be suppressed.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE INFORMATION IN DEPUTY STACEY'S
AFFIDAVIT WAS BASED ON RELIABLE
INFORMATION FROM CREDIBLE SOURCES.

Defendant claims that information from Wyoming sheriffs deputies, Threll Orton
and the Wyoming informant was unreliable and did not establish probable cause for the
search of the trailer. Aplt. Br. at 18-24. Defendant is incorrect. Statements from law
enforcement officials provided in the course of an investigation are presumptively
reliable. And while information from the informants is not presumptively reliable, their
statements were still properly relied upon by Deputy Stacey and the magistrate because
they were corroborated by other known facts.

9

A.

Statements of Law Enforcement Officials in
the Course of an Investigation are
Presumptively Reliable.

Defendant attacks the reliability of the information from the Wyoming sheriffs
deputies as based largely on uncorroborated "heresay" [sic], which established "only" that
defendant had been arrested and the drugs she had purchased in Ogden confiscated. Aplt.
Br. at 23-24. This attempt to minimize the importance of the Wyoming deputies'
information in establishing probable cause for the search is unavailing.
The principal sources of the information included in the search affidavit were
Deputies Kim Clark and Jody Gardner of the Lincoln County, Wyoming, Sheriffs Office.
On June 7, 2000, Clark and Gardner informed Deputy Stacey that defendant had been
arrested and that marijuana and methamphetamine had been seized. R. 18, 111 [a]. They
ftirther stated that defendant had admitted purchasing the drugs in Ogden and that she had
stopped at her home in Randolph before proceeding to Wyoming, where she was arrested.
Id
As the trial court correctly concluded, these statements, as communications
between law enforcement officers in the course of an investigation, are presumptively
reliable. R. 112. The Utah Supreme Court stated: "[T]here is a presumption that law
enforcement officers will convey information to each other truthfully." State v. Nielsen,
727 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1986). This presumption has been accepted by the United States
Supreme Court and lower courts in virtually every jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 111 (1965) ("Observations of fellow officers of the Government
10

engaged in a common investigation are plainly a reliable basis for a warrant applied for
by one of their number"); 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment, § 3.5(a) (3d ed. 2003) ("[L]ower courts have consistently held that another
law enforcement officer is a reliable source and that consequently no special showing of
reliability need be made as a part of the probable cause determination").; see Nielsen, 727
P.2d at 192 ("[T]here is a presumption that law enforcement officers will convey
information to each other truthfully"); see also Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 111; LaFave, §
3.5(a). Accordingly, the reviewing magistrate correctly relied upon those statements in
determining there was probable cause to search defendant's trailer home.
B.

Reliable Informant Statements Were Properly
Included in Deputy Stacey's Affidavit

Defendant claims the statements from Threll Orton and the Wyoming informant
were unreliable because the affidavit did not disclose the time or context for the
statements or disclose any background that would establish credibility. Aplt. Br. at 19.
Defendant also claims the affidavit should have revealed that Orton was under arrest at
the time he made the allegations. Aplt. Br. at 20. "The affidavit reveals nothing about
Threll Orton except his name and his uncorroborated allegations of buying drugs at
Defendant's trailer." Aplt. Br. at 19.3 These claims lack merit.

' The trial court did not address these contentions because it found the
presumptively reliable information from the Wyoming deputies sufficient to establish
probable cause. R. 112. The trial court is correct. Nonetheless, the State discusses the
reliability of Orton and the Wyoming informant because their statements were also
properly relied upon by the magistrate and bolster the existence of probable cause. See
11

The reliability of an informant is assessed under the totality of the circumstances
and in light of factors articulated by this Court in Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d
231, 235-36 (Utah App.1997).4 Under Mulcahy, reliable informants are those who are
identified by name, have a clear basis for knowing the information they provide and offer
detailed statements that are at least partially corroborated by investigating officers or
deputies. Id. Application of these factors demonstrates that Orton and the Wyoming
informant were properly relied upon by the magistrate in determining probable cause fur
the search.
Threll Orton. Under the first Mulcahy factor, an identified "citizen-informant"
whose basis of knowledge is clearly stated is high on the reliability scale, while a
confidential informants, '"whose basis of knowledge and veracity are typically unknown,"
is toward "the low-end of the reliability scale." Id. at 235 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). Orton, although apparently not a "citizen informant" who
"Volunteered] information out of concern for the community," id., still shows indicia of

State v. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, ^ 10, n.6, 12 P.3d 110 (u[W]e may affirm the trial
court's ruling 'if it is sustainable on any legal ground . . . even [if different] from that
stated by the trial court.'" (citing Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass 'n, 461 P.2d 290,
293, n.2 (1969)).
4

This Court has stated that the three Mulcahy factors apply where "the information
obtained from [an] informant [ ] is the primary support for the search warrant..." State
v. DeLuna, 2001 UT App 401, \ 9 , 40 P.3d 1136 (emphasis added). Here, because the
informants do not provide the primary support for the search warrant, strict application of
Mulcahy is not required. Nonetheless, the Mulcahy factors are illuminating and will be
used to articulate the basis for the reliability of the non-police sources of information.
12

reliability under the first factor because he is fully identified and his basis of knowledge
clearly stated. See R. 18, 111; Deputy's Report.
The second Mulcahy factor concerns whether "the informant gave enough detail
about the observed criminal activity to support a [warrant]." State v. Deluna, 2001 UT
App 401,H 19, 40 P.3d 1136 (alteration in original; citation omitted). Under this factor, it
is clear that the information from Orton, although summarized in the search affidavit,
provided details sufficient to identify defendant and pinpoint the location of the trailer
where Orton purchased the drugs. R. 18, 111; Deputy's Report. Additionally, Orton's
information was also "more reliable [because] it is apparent that [he] observed the details
personally, instead of simply relaying information from a third party." Mulcahy, 943 P.2d
at 236.
Finally, under the third Mulcahy factor—corroboration—Deputy Stacey confirmed
the essential details of Orton's account by determining there was a woman named Laura
who lived at the trailer Orton described. Id.; see R. 18, 111; Deputy's Report. Orton's
statements were further corroborated by defendant's arrest for possession of
methamphetamine—one of the drugs Orton claimed he purchased at defendant's
trailer—as well as the report from the Wyoming informant that defendant was planning to
sell the drugs in Wyoming.
Despite Orton's strong showing of reliability under Mulcahy, defendant presses
her challenge to his reliability on several points. For example, defendant points to alleged
discrepancies between the search affidavit and the Deputy's Report. Aplt. Br. at 19. She
13

notes that although Orton states that he purchased the drugs from "a woman in Randolph
named Laura/' the search affidavit states that he "bought methamphetamine from Laura
Dable at the trailer described int his affidavit on at least two occasions." R. 18; Deputy's
Report.
However, defendant omits the fact that Deputy Stacey states in his report that he
investigated Orton's statement and was able to locate the described trailer and determine
that it belonged to defendant. See Deputy's Report. Thus, his representation to the
magistrate in the search affidavit that Orton purchased the drugs from Laura Dable was
supported by his independent investigation of Orton's statement.
More fundamentally, defendant's focus on Orton's inability to provide the frill
name of the person who sold the drugs misses the point. The real issue for purposes of
determining the validity of the search warrant is not who lives at the home, but whether it
was the place where he purchased the drugs. Because Orton's description was clearly
adequate to locate the trailer, his inability to frilly identify who lived there is of only
peripheral importance.
Defendant also argues that the search affidavit should have disclosed that Orton
was under arrest when he told Deputy Stacey he had purchased drugs at defendant's
trailer home. "This was not a case where a disinterested citizen supplied the
information." Aplt. Br. at 20. But this characterization of Orton's alleged bias is mere
speculation. Although Orton's custody status raises questions concerning his motives for
speaking to Deputy Stacey, there is nothing in the record to establish what those motives
14

might be. In the absence of any record to the contrary, this Court should not accept
defendant's invitation to speculate about the possible ulterior motives Orton might have
had. See State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (if "appellant fails
to provide an adequate record on appeal, [we] must assume the regularity of the
proceedings below"); State v. Rawlings, 829 P.2d 150, 152-53 (Utah App. 1992) ("I]n the
absence of an adequate record on appeal, we cannot address the issues raised and presume
the correctness of the disposition made by the trial court"), overruled on other grounds by
State v. Gordon, 913 P.3d 350, 357 n.3 (Utah 1996).
Finally, defendant attacks Orton's reliability by attempting to liken this case U.S.
v. Danhauer, 229 F.3d 1002, 1006 (10th Cir. 2001), in which the court held that a search
affidavit based almost entirely on information gleaned from a single confidential
informant did not establish a nexus between illegal activity and defendant's residence. Id.
at 1007-08.5 Defendant claims that there are "striking similarities" between her case and
Danhauer because Stacey's affidavit, like that in Dauhauer, was based on
uncorroborated, "repetitive and tenuous facts" supplied by an unreliable informant. Aplt.
Br. at 20-21.
Danhauer, however, is readily distinguishable. First, the identity of the informant
in Danhauer was never revealed to the magistrate, id at 1006, while Orton was identified
by name in Deputy Stacey's affidavit. Second, where the basis for the Danhauer

5

The court, nonetheless, upheld the search based on the "good faith exception."
U.S. v. Danhauer, 229 F.3d 1002, 1007-08 (10th Cir. 2001)
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informant's knowledge of the clandestine lab was never disclosed, id., Deputy Stacey
stated in his affidavit that Orton knew of defendant's drug-dealing activities because he
had purchased controlled substances from her at her home. Finally, there was no
significant corroboration of the information provided by the Danhauer informant. Id.
Here, by contrast, virtually all significant details of Orton's statements were corroborated.
As noted above, Deputy Stacey confirmed the existence and location of the trailer home
where Orton claimed to have purchased drugs and that a woman named Laura lived there.
Defendant's involvement in buying and selling drugs was also corroborated, in part, by
her own admissions.
The Wyoming informant. As defendant points out, confidential informants are
often viewed with some skepticism because their veracity or basis of knowledge may be
unknown. See Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235 ( "[A]nonymous tips are toward 'the low-end of
the reliability scale'") (citation omitted). However, in this case, the reliability of the
information supplied by the Wyoming informant was independently bolstered by the fact
that most of it had been corroborated at the time Deputy Stacey requested the search
warrant. Corroboration of some of the information supplied by an informant increases the
likelihood that the remaining information will also be true. See, e.g., State v. Weinberg,
575 A.2d 1003, 1008 (Conn.) ("The theory of corroboration is that a statement which has
been shown true in some respects is reasonably likely to be true in the remaining
respects") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 967
(1990). The information from the Wyoming informant indicated that defendant was
16

planning to purchase drugs in Ogden on June 6, 2000 and that she intended to sell the
drugs in Wyoming. Id. On June 7, 2000, when Deputy Stacey presented the search
affidavit to the magistrate, defendant had been arrested in Wyoming for possession of
marijuana and methamphetamine, which she admitted she had purchased in Ogden. Id.
Because defendant's arrest and admissions partially corroborated statements from the
informant, the remaining uncorroborated claim—that defendant's purpose in coming
Wyoming was to sell drugs—is also entitled to some credence. This fact is important
because it indicates defendant was involved in the sale of marijuana and
methamphetamine and bolsters Orton's claim that he had purchased drugs at defendant's
trailer on at least two occasions.
Thus, contrary to defendant's claims, the sources cited by Deputy Stacey in the
search affidavit were reliable. Accordingly, defendant's claim that the magistrate erred in
relying on information from those sources in finding probable cause to search the trailer is
meritless.
II.

THE TOTALITY OF FACTS PRESENTED IN THE
AFFIDAVIT—INCLUDING DEFENDANT'S ARREST
FOR POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES,
HER ADMISSION THAT SHE HAD JUST PURCHASED
DRUGS AND THAT SHE HAD STOPPED BY HER
TRAILER AFTERWARD—ESTABLISHED PROBABLE
CAUSE TO SEARCH THE TRAILER.

Defendant claims that the affidavit supporting the request for a search warrant was
defective because it "failed to establish reasonable grounds to believe that contraband or
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evidence of a crime would be found at defendant's residence." Aplt. Br. at 14. This
claim lacks merit.
When reviewing the adequacy of an affidavit in support of a search warrant,
[t]he magistrate's task is to decide whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including
the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying
hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.
State v. McArthur, 2000 UT App 23, \ 29, 996 P.2d 555 (quotations and citations
omitted), cert, denied, 9 P.3d 170 (2000). When reviewing a challenge to a search
warrant, this Court "pay[s] great deference to the magistrate's determination." State v.
Vigk 871 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah App. 1994).
Under the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate correctly concluded there
was a fair probability that evidence of illicit drug use or trafficking would be found at
defendant's trailer. First, the magistrate knew that defendant was in custody on drug
charges and that she had admitted purchasing the drugs in Ogden. R. 18, 11 l[a].
Although "probable cause to arrest does not automatically provide probable cause to
search the arrestee's home," it does, under some circumstances, increase "the likelihood
that that person's residence contains evidence of the crime . . ." U.S. v. Jones, 994 F.2d
1051, 1055-56 (3rd Cir. 1993) (emphasis added).
Second, search of defendant's trailer was supported by information suggesting that
defendant was not just a drug user, but a drug dealer. The Wyoming informant stated that
defendant's trip to Wyoming was for the purpose of selling drugs. R. 18. Additionally,
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Threll Orton informed Deputy Stacey that he had purchased methamphetamine at
defendant's trailer on at least two occasions. Id. Because there was reliable information
that defendant was a drug dealer, the magistrate properly found probable cause to search
her home. As one court succinctly stated: "[I]n the case of drug dealers, evidence is
likely to be found where the dealers live.'" U.S. v. Terry, 911 F.2d 272, 275 (9th
Cir.1990) (citation omitted). This common sense observation that drug dealers will likely
keep controlled substances and other evidence of illegal activities at their homes has been
recognized by a number of courts. See, e.g., United States v. Emmons, 24 F.3d 1210
(10th Cir.1994) (affidavit sufficient where large quantities of marijuana made it
reasonable to believe defendant was a dealer and officer stated that in his experience
distributors keep records, packaging, and assets at home); United States v. Pitts, 6 F.3d
1366 (9th Cir.1993) (nexus can be inferred on probable cause affidavit establishing
defendant's ongoing drug dealing and that place to be searched is his residence); United
States v. Restrepo, 994 F.2d 173 (5th Cir.1993) (held there was probable cause to search
defendant's home where affiant stated that in his experience "drug traffickers maintain
records relating to drug activity at a place such as a home" and "that contraband, drug
proceeds and other indicia of drug trafficking such as coded telephone numbers,
photographs and firearms are secreted in safe places such as homes").
Third, the fact that defendant admitted she had stopped at her home after her drug
purchase in Ogden and before her arrest also supports probable cause to search her home.
Many courts have recognized that a defendant's arrest for selling drugs can create
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probable cause to search the defendant's home, especially when the seller went to his
home prior to the sale or the sale occurred near the home. See, e.g.. United States v.
Hulett, 22 F.3d 779, 781 (8th Cir.1994) (affirming probable cause to search defendant's
home for records of "voluminous drug trafficking" based on telephone calls to
defendant's home concerning drug transactions); United States v. Corral, 970 F.2d 719
(10th Cir.1992) (probable cause to search defendant's residence where she returned to her
home after arranging a drug sale, presumably to retrieve the drugs); People v. Hakel, 870
P.2d 1224, 1229 (Colo. 1994) (probable cause to search defendant's home where
defendant traveled directly from home to motel where sale was made); see also LaFave,
supra, § 3.7(d) and n. 143-44.
Taken together, the facts provided by Deputy Stacey in support of his request for a
search warrant are more than sufficient to establish probable cause to search defendant's
trailer. The totality of the circumstances—defendant's arrest for possession of controlled
substances, her admission that she purchased the drugs in Ogden and that she had stopped
at her trailer before her arrest in Wyoming, and information from two informants
suggesting defendant was a drug dealer and had sold drugs from the trailer on at least two
occasions—creates the strong and entirely reasonable inference that illegal substances or
other relevant evidence would be discovered at her residence. Accordingly, defendant's
attack on the magistrate's probable cause determination is without merit.
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III.

WHETHER THE SEARCH WARRANT IMPROPERLY
AUTHORIZED A NIGHTTIME, "NO-KNOCK" SEARCH
IS INCONSEQUENTIAL GIVEN THAT THE SEARCH
WAS ACTUALLY CONDUCTED DURING THE
DAYTIME WHILE DEFENDANT WAS NOT HOME.

Defendant claims some sections of the search warrant were improperly left blank
and that these "omissions" violated Utah law because they improperly authorized a
nighttime, "no-knock" search. Aplt. Br. at 24-25. This argument is frivolous because the
search was conducted during the day while defendant was not at home.
The search warrant was prepared by using a standard form, portions of which may
be filled in by the requesting officer and the magistrate. R. 11. One section of the form
gives the magistrate the option of authorizing execution of the warrant either during the
"daytime" or "anytime, day or night." Id. Another section allows the magistrate to
indicate whether the officers "(are) [or[ (are not)" authorized to execute a no-knock
search. These sections were not filled in and defendant apparently believes that the
magistrate's failure to circle or choose among the listed alternatives means the warrant
authorized the execution of the warrant without notice and at any time, day or night.
Aplt. Br. at 24-25.
These claims are without merit. First, the claim that the warrant somehow
improperly authorized a nighttime search is moot because the warrant was not served at
night. A defendant suffers no prejudice when an improper nighttime search warrant is
served during the day. See, e.g., Salt Lake City v. Trujillo, 854 P.2d 603, 609 (Utah App.
1993) (a defendant suffers no prejudice when search warrant improperly authorizing
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nighttime search is executed during the day). Defendant admits that the search warrant
was served during the daylight hours at 6:32 p.m. June 7, 2000. R. 125:12.6 Thus, even if
the warrant improperly authorized a nighttime search, defendant suffered no prejudice.7
Defendant's claim that the search warrant improperly authorized a "no-knock"
search fails for similar reasons. Ordinarily, an officer serving a search warrant may not
forcibly enter a residence unless, after giving notice of his authority to search, he
determines no one is home, in which case he may ccuse such force as is reasonably
necessary to enter;.. ." Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210(2). Here, defendant was in jail in
Wyoming and so was not at home when the search was conducted. Thus, defendant, not
surprisingly, has no idea whether the officers knocked before entering; nor has she
introduced any evidence to suggest they did not. Absent some evidence to the contrary,
this Court should assume the search warrant was served properly and that the officers

6

"Daytime" is currently defined as the hours between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. Utah
Code Ann. § 77-23-201(1) (Supp. 2002). Prior to adoption of that statutory definition,
the term "night" had been judicially defined as one-half hour after sunset until one-half
hour before sunrise. State v. Simmons, 844 P.2d 614 (Utah App. 1993). Under either
definition, the search warrant was clearly served during the daytime.
7

Defendant also seems to suggest that the search was improper even though it
began in the daytime because it did not conclude until 10:16 p.m., which defendant
contends was "night." Aplt. Br. at 25. This argument fails because Utah law imposes
time limits only for serving a warrant, not for the duration of the search. See, e.g., Utah
Code Ann. § 77-23-205(1) ("The magistrate shall insert a direction in the warrant that it
be served in the daytime . . . " ) (emphasis added). This interpretation of the time limits in
the Utah statute is consistent with the interpretation of similar requirements in other
states. See, e.g., Shope v. State, 396 A.2d 282, 288 (Maryland App. 1979) (search
executed pursuant to a "daytime" search warrant not improper because search concluded
after dark).
22

gave proper notice before entering defendant's trailer. See, e.g., Miller, 718 P.2d at 405
(if "appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, [we] must assume the
regularity of the proceedings below"). But even assuming the officers conducted an
improper no-knock search, the error is harmless where the home is unoccupied. State v.
Buck, 756 P.2d 700 (Utah 1988); see also, Trujillo, 854 P.2d at 702 (*"[I]t is of no
consequence that the police failed to announce their authority and purpose prior to entry if
no one was present therein at the time'") (citing 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A
Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 4.8(b), at 277).
IV.

ALTHOUGH UNNECESSARY IN THIS CASE, THE
"GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION59 TO THE WARRANT
REQUIREMENT WOULD VALIDATE THE SEARCH
BECAUSE OFFICERS ACTED IN GOOD FAITH.

Finally, defendant argues that this Court should not apply the so-called "good faith
exception" to the warrant requirement to validate the search in the event that the warrant
is deemed defective. Aplt. Br. at 25-28. In the State's view, this Court need not reach
this issue because the search warrant was supported by probable cause and so the good
faith exception is unnecessary. Nonetheless, in the interest of thoroughness, the State will
briefly address defendant's claim.
Under the good faith exception, evidence seized pursuant to a defective search
warrant need not be suppressed if the executing officer acted with an objective, good faith
belief that the warrant was properly issued by a neutral magistrate. See United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920-24 (1984). "There is a presumption that when an officer relies
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upon a warrant, the officer is acting in good faith

It is only when the officer's reliance

on the warrant is 'wholly unwarranted' that good faith is absent." State v. Horton, 848
P.2d 708, 711 (Utah App. 1993) (citation omitted).
The Supreme Court recognizes four situations in which an officer would not have
reasonable grounds for believing a warrant was properly issued: (1) the issuing
magistrate is misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or
would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth; (2) the issuing
magistrate wholly abandons his judicial role and fails to perform his neutral and detached
function; (3) the warrant is based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause
as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; (4) the warrant is so
facially deficient that it failed to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be
seized. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23. In these situations, the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule does not apply.
None of the Leon scenarios apply in this case. Defendant has presented no
evidence to suggest that the magistrate was misled or that Deputy Stacey intentionally or
recklessly omitted important facts. See Horton, 848 P. 2d at 711 ("The mere omission of
information that could have been included in an affidavit does not necessarily amount to
an intent to mislead"). Nor is there any suggestion that the magistrate was not neutral and
detached in reviewing Stacey's affidavit. The affidavit contained numerous details from
several sources, including law enforcement officials, and clearly described defendant's
trailer and the items to be seized. The affidavit and search warrant also particularized the
24

place to be searched and the items to be seized. Accordingly, the affidavit and search
warrant was not a "bare bones" affidavit, "devoid of facts." See Leon, 468 U.S. at 926.
As such, the affidavit, even assuming it did not establish probable cause, was nonetheless
executed in good faith.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that defendant's
conviction be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \cf^\ day of May, 2003
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
BRETT J. DELPORTO
Assistant Attorney General
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77-23-205. Time for service — Officer may request assistance.
(1) The magistrate shall insert a direction in the warrant that it be serve^
in the daytime, unless the affidavits or oral testimony state a reasonable ca ^
to believe a search is necessary in the night to seize the property prior i
being concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered, or for other good reason, ^
which case he may insert a direction that it be served any time of t h ^ a % h e
night. An officer may request other persons to assist him in conducting
search.
, i^te of
(2) The search warrant shall be served within ten days from the a y ,
issuance. Any search warrant not executed within this time shall be voia
shall be returned to the court or magistrate as not executed.

77-23-210. Force used in executing warrant — When notice of authority is required as a prerequisite.
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing entry into any building,
room, conveyance, compartment, or other enclosure, the officer executing the
warrant may use such force as is reasonably necessary to enter:
(1) if, after notice of his authority and purpose, there is no response or
he is not admitted with reasonable promptness; or
(2) without notice of his authority and purpose, if the magistrate
issuing the warrant directs in the warrant that the officer need not give
notice. The magistrate shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, that the
object of the search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or
that physical harm may result to any person if notice were given.
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A. W. Lauritzen
Attorney at Law/ Attorney for Defendant
P. O. Box 171
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (435) 753-3391
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF RICH, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LAURA DABLE
Defendant,

FINDINGS AND ORDER
DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
Case No. 00110027 FS
Judge Judkins

This matter came on for hearing before the Court on 25 June, 2001 at the hour of 10:00
A.M. and the Court having been fully briefed on the claims of the parties and having attended to
argument of counsel having found the pertinent and relevant facts of the case as follows:

FACTS AS PRESENTED BY THE CASE
1. In April of 2000 Officer Dale Stacey spoke with a man named Threll Orton after he had
been arrested by Wyoming authorities and while he was incarcerated in Evanston, Wyoming; the
arrest was based on a charge of allegedly selling Methamphetamine and Marijuana. Mr.
Orton informed Officer Stacey that he had gotten the Methamphetamine, which provided the basis
for the Wyoming charge,froma woman in Randolph named Laura and a description of her
residence was provided.

2. On June 6, 2000, Officer Stacey allegedly was contacted by Deputy Kim Clark from
the Lincoln County, Wyoming Sheriffs Office. Officer Clark requested that officers in Randolph,
Utah watch out for a woman named Laura Dable who had a trailer on West Park Street. Officer
Clark allegedly told Officer Stacey that an informant had told them Defendant was going to
Ogden to pick up some Marijuana and Methamphetamine to sell in Lincoln County and that he
felt that they had enough information to make a traffic stop and search the vehicle. Officer Stacey
stated in a June 14, 2000 report, "We did not see Dable in Randolph that evening.", referring to
June 6,200a 1
3. On June 7, 2000, Officer Stacey allegedly received a telephone callfromOfficer Clark
stating that Wyoming authorities had arrested Defendant, and that she had in her possession
approximately 4 ounces of Marijuana and 8 grams of Methamphetamine. It was reported to
Officer Stacey that Defendant admitted to Officer Kim Clark and Officer Jodie Gardner that shehad bought the drugs in Ogden, and then stopped at her trailer in Randolph before proceeding to
Wyoming where she was arrested.
4. Officer Stacey, relying on the above information, prepared an Affidavit^ copy of which
is onfilewith the Court. Officer Stacey, without assistancefromthe Rich County Attorney
presented the Affidavit and a proposed Search Warrant, which warrant is attached
hereto as Exhibit B. to Judge Ross McKinnon to "look over",at around 6:00 p.m. on June 7,
2000.
1

All of the above data camefromthe notes of Officer Stacey, provided to Defendant by the Rich County Attorney's
office pursuant to a Discovery request served by Defendant.

5. Judge MdKinnon, accepted the Affidavit as prepared by Officer Dale Stacey without
noting changes, deletions or additions and based thereon issued a Search Warrant for the trailer of
Laura Dable at West Park Street in Randolph, Utah, authorizing a search for controlled
substances, packaging material, or any type of paraphernalia used with illegal controlled
substances. The search was conducted and was concluded at 22:35 hrs., sunset on June 7th, 2000
was at 20:59 hours.
The Court now concludes as a matter of law that:
6. The Statement and information in the Affidavit attributed to Law Enforcement Officers
even if said officer or officers were not known to the Affiant need no other verification or other
indicia of reliability and may be, taken as true by the magistrate simply because the informant
was a Peace Officer.
7. The information provided in the Affidavit, without any weight given to it except as
provided by the Wyoming officers was sufficient, to justify issuance of a Search Warrant given
the supporting circumstances of this case.
8. The fact that Defendant was not mirandized prior to her purported statement to
Wyoming Peace Officers does not require that the Magistrate refuse to consider said statements
as providing part of the basis for issuance of a warrant or that the Court give less weight to said
unmirandized statement.
9. Since the information provided in the Affidavit exclusive of that attributed to Threll
Orton is sufficient to justify the issuance of a Search Warrant; the omission of certain facts
surrounding his statement is not material to the evaluation of the Affidavit.

10. Since the search commenced during daylight hours, the unsupported direction that
the Search Warrant could be executed day or night is harmless error.
11. The fact that the Search Warrant was a form in blank and was incompletely filled
out is harmless error.
12. The fact that the Affidavit contained unsupportable allegations, since those facts need
not necessarily be found in order to support issuance of the Search Warrant, that inaccuracy
does not bear on the adequacy of the Affidavit.
Based on the foregoingfindings,the Motion to Suppress Evidence Seized pursuant to the
Search Warrant issued in this case is denied.
Dated this %_ day of AA V I [ 2002
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
RICH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 001100027
Transcript of Audio Tape,

vs •
LAURA DABLE,
Defendant,

Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing
Honorable Clint S. Judkins presiding.
First District Court Courthouse
Randolph, Utah
June 26, 2001

APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiff:

JOE A. GREENLIEF
County Attorney

For the Defendant:

A. W. LAURITZEN
Attorney at Law

RODNEY M. FELSHAW
Registered Professional Reporter
First District Court
P. 0. Box 873
Brigham City, UT
84302-0873

ORIGINAL
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1

THE COURT:

Take the case of State of Utah versus

2

Laura Dable.

3

plaintiff's motion to -- excuse me.

4

suppress.

5

This is the time set for argument on
Defendant's motion to

Mr. Lauritzen.

MR. LAURITZEN:

Yes, Your Honor.

I have submitted

6

briefs in this matter.

I think that this is a case that

7

probably stands out of my repertoire of practice before the

8

many courts in this land as an area where people simply just

9

don't take the Fourth Amendment seriously.

I sometimes

10

wonder if the justice of the peace system, in their

11

instructions, don't tell the judges to go ahead and deal with

12

these things and expect that a higher court will take care of

13 it.
14

This is kind of shocking case in a way because there is

15

simply no basis on which one could credit the information

16

that was supplied to the justice with any aura of

17

credibility.

Certainly the officer had some information two

18 months before from an individual who he didn't know from a
19 bale of hay, so to speak.

He didn't do anything to

20

investigate that information, to verify anything that was

21

given to him there.

22

investigation as far as is shown on the affidavits.

23

In fact, he didn't really open an

Thereafter, two months later, he was apprised of

24

something that involved my client and on that basis he dug

25

out this old information and provided it to the justice,
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1

still not knowing anything about the credibility of the

2

individual who supplied the evidence or having given any

3 subsequent investigation to see if there was any basis for it
4

from his own knowledge.

The justice apparently looked at the

5 matter rather uncritically and signed the warrant.

I just

6 can't se$ how, under the circumstances, that this is an area
7 which we can allow to go on.
8

Then, the warrant itself is a blank.

Some of the areas

9 J were filled in and some of the areas were not.

It seems to

10 me that that's a serious default in itself because it leaves
11 areas open for someone to modify.

It isn't like the peace

12 officer who comes in and raises his right hand is necessarily
13 the one who serves the warrant.
14 officer.

The want is to any peace

Who knows whose hands those might pass through?

So

15 the warrant itself seems to me to be very suspect.
16

I suggest that under the circumstances there was

17 certainly no need for a hurry.

In fact, the defendant was

18 under arrest in another jurisdiction.
19 available for a warrant.

The telephones were

There was plenty of time to

20 transcribe all of these matters into the original without use
21 of a printed formed so that the directions were clear and not
22 subject to abridgement or change.
23

Again, I'm not going to belabor it, but I've gone into

24 several areas.

One of the things that I'm concerned about is

25 when the justice looked at the warrant he should have

Page 4
1 probably noted that the individual had not been Mirandised.
2 That may very well have caused him to question it if that had
3 been -- if that information had been given him, that there
4 was -- had been no Miranda.
5

But more seriously, probably more seriously than any of

6 the things we see here in this particular warrant, is the
7

fact that there were some omissions of some very serious

8 matters which could very well have colored the thinking of
9

the magistrate.

If he had known that the information that

10 was supplied to the officers, and which was narrated to him
11 in the affidavit, was taken from a person who was being held
12 under arrest un-Mirandised and who had a good deal to gain,
13 possibly, by providing information in exchange for his
14 freedom.
15

None of this was noted on the affidavit.

It isn't like someone came up, a citizen came up and

16 volunteered and said I have some information as a concerned
17 citizen.

Ifm completely —

18 have no axe to grind.

and in this particular case I

When we have a person who is under

19 duress, who is under arrest, I think that should certainly be
20 noted.
21

I think that was a serious omission.

All in all, I suggest that the warrant was of such a

22 nature and was issued based on an affidavit with some
23 deficiencies to the point that in fact the search itself was
24 invalid and was not justified by the strictures of the Fourth
25 Amendment and any evidence seized thereby should be
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1 suppressed.
2

THE COURT:

Mr. Greenlief.

3

MR. GREENLIEF:

I have not had the privilege of

4 reading Mr. Lauritzen's memo in response to plaintiff's
5 opposition of the defendant's motion to suppress.
6

that it was sent on the 16th day of May.

7 believe it was not.

I just —

It says

I have no reason to

it's not in my file.

I talked

81 to my secretary and she didn't know about it, hadn't heard of
9

it either, but I stand as the one at fault because it's my

10 office and I don't think it's the secretary's fault.

I just

11 didn't get it in any event.
12

However, the main thing which Mr. Lauritzen speaks of

13 this morning, and also in his briefs and so forth, is that
14 the trouble with the information garnered from the defendant
15 in the Lincoln County prison -- or Lincoln County jail.
16 Maybe it was Uintah County.
17 was Uintah County.
18

No, I believe it was —

okay, it

It was down south of us here.

But the key to the entire thing is that the primary thing

19 that the officers were relying on is that there was
20 information from two very good —

well, two other officers in

21 Uintah County, Evanston, that the defendant had been stopped
22 and was at that time in jail in Uintah County in Evanston for
23 drug matters.

That's the way I understand the case and

24 that's the key to it.

These two officers knew what they had

25 found and that's pretty well set forth in the briefs and so
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1 forth.
2

So the information of Therell was not necessary.

It was

3

supportive, as was stated in our original response.

And that

4

is all that it actually was.

5

it happ ened first by a couple> of months, but that was not the

It was put first simply because

6 actual thing.
7

It1 s my understanding that Mr. Orton was given his

8 Miranda again by —

well, no.

He was not because he was not

9 given it because he wasnft charged.

They were just talking

10

to him about this particular lady.

11

any thought by the Rich Count.y officers, so at that time it

12

wasn't necessary to give him the Miranda.

13

but it wasn t because of anything Rich County had done.

14

He wasn't the focus of

He was in jail,

I believe on those bases we'll submit it.
Rebuttal 9

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. LAURITZEN:

17

THE COURT:

I'll. submit it, Your Honor.

Well, one problem that youfve got,

18

counsel , both of you is that nobody has given me a firm set

19

of facts in this case.

20

certain facts in your originail memorandum in support of the

21

petitio n to suppress.

22

only assume that those facts are true and accurate.

23

Now, Mr. Lauritzen, you've alleged

Since nobody objected to that I can

The facts that the court finds in this case are that in

24

April o f 2000, Officer Staceyr spoke with a man named Therell

25

Orton a fter he'd been arrested by Wyoming authorities and
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1 while incarcerated in Evanston, Wyoming.
2 Stacey got in —

And that Officer

Mr. Orton informed Officer Stacey that he'd

3 gotten the methamphetamine, which provided the basis for the
4 Wyoming charge, from a woman in Randolph named Laura and a
5 description of the residence was provided.
6
7

Now, you've not disputed that, Mr. Greenlief.

Is that

then correct?

8

MR. GREENLIEF:

We've not disputed that he said

9 Laura.
10

THE COURT:

But he didn't say Laura Dable?

11

MR. GREENLIEF:

No, but there are no other Lauras in

12 Randolph, to my knowledge.
13

THE COURT:

Well, how do we know that?

14 affidavit state that?

Did the

So the court finds that as a fact,

15 that -16

MR. GREENLIEF:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. GREENLIEF:

I believe, Your Honor, if I may.

Try me out.
I believe he did give a description

19 of the trailer and of the outside of it and so forth. An
20 eight on the front, the color, where it was on the south
21 end —

excuse me, the north end of the trailer court on Park

22 Street.
23

THE COURT:

I don't think there's any question, even

24 though that Mr. Lauritzen didn't put that in his statement of
25 facts, and which you didn't address in your memorandum, that
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1

the trailer was described with specificity, but I think --

2

let's look at the affidavit that was submitted in support of

3

the request for the search warrant.

4I

(Pause in the proceedings.)

51

THE COURT:

Yes.

It says Therell Orton told your

6

affiant that he was able to buy methamphetamine from Laura

7

Dable.

Already, however, itfs agreed that that was Laura,

8 1 not Laura Dable, the person living in the described trailer.
9

There is a description of the trailer.

Dable was arrested in

101 Lincoln County, Wyoming on 6/7/00 for possession of
11 methamphetamine and some marijuana.
12

Mr. Lauritzen, there's

no dispute as to that?

13

MR. LAURITZEN:

14

THE COURT:

No.

All right.

The court further finds that

15

this Therell Orton did not say Laura Dable, he said, Laura,

16

but then went on with specificity and described a trailer,

17

which is the trailer which is the subject of the search.

18

That occurred in April of 2000.

19

Officer Stacey was contacted by Deputy Kim Clark from Lincoln

20

County, Wyoming and Officer Clark told Officer Stacey that an

21

informant had told them the defendant was going to Ogden to

22

pick up some methamphetamine and marijuana to sell in Lincoln

23

County and apparently he was going to stop and search the

24

vehicle.

25

Then, on June 6th, 2000,

Mr. Lauritzen, you'll agree that those are facts?
MR. LAURITZEN:

They were in the affidavit.
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1

MR. GREENLIEF:

Also, I believe Jody Gardner was the

2 additional officer from Uintah County in Wyoming.

In Lincoln

3 County, rather.
4

THE COURT:

Kim Clark and an Officer Jody Gardner,

5 both officers in Lincoln County, Wyoming.

Then your next

6

facts, Mr. Lauritzen, indicate, and the court will so find,

7

that there was a telephone conversation between Officer

8 Stacey and Officer Kim Clark and Officer Jody Gardner from
9 Wyoming, wherein they indicated that they had a confidential
10 informant who had indicated that the defendant was going to
11 pick up methamphetamine in Ogden.
12

All right.

Then we'll go to number four of the facts set forth by

13 Mr. Lauritzen.

Officer Stacey relied upon the above

14 information prepared in the affidavit, a copy of which is
15 attached hereto as exhibit A.

Officer Stacey, without

16 assistance of Rich County, presented the affidavit with the
17 proposed search warrant.
18

Wait a minute.

Let's go back to number three of Mr.

19 Lauritzen's alleged facts.

It says it was reported to

20 Officer Stacey that the defendant admitted to Officer Kim
21 Clark and Officer Jody Gardner that she had bought the drugs
22 in Ogden and had stopped at her trailer in Randolph before
23 proceeding to Wyoming where she was arrested.
24

Mr. Lauritzen, what I would like you to do, I'm going to

25 direct your attention to a couple of things here and ask you
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1 arrest; faced with not enough evidence themselves to make an
2 arrest and wanting to get some more evidence.

They may have

3 had some reasons for their own to go ahead and try to supply
4

facts which would allow them to ultimately gain additional

5 evidence.
6

I don't know that.

The other reason, of course, is that Ms. Dable herself

7 was under arrest at that time.
8
9J

There's no evidence before

this court at this time that she had been Mirandised.
THE COURT:

Do you think that there's some case law

10 that says she has to be?
11

MR. LAURITZEN:

I can't find any, but I suggest that

12 that's certainly a factor that the justice should take into
13 consideration, whether or not the person had been warned,
14 number one, of their right to remain silent which would give
15 them ease in dealing with the police.

I think that's the

16 whole reason for the Miranda is to give them ease and not
17 feel threatened, realizing that they have certain rights.
18 And with that in mind they might be more likely, number one,
19 to speak truthfully or, number two, not to speak at all.
20
21

Anyway, those are the reasons I give the court.
THE COURT:

Okay.

I'll direct your attention to

22 another deficiency in the search warrant and hear your
23 position on that.

That is the, and this causes some concern

24 to the court, the search warrant says you are therefore
25 commanded to make immediate search in the day time, any time
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1 and in so doing indicate the following.
2

findings here.

Ifve made certain

I'm going to find that the information

3 provided by the peace officers out of Lincoln County, Wyoming
4 was such that it did not require any more verification of a
5

reliable witness other than being peace officers, because

6

they just. relaid information that she'd picked up drugs in

7

Ogden and told them that she'd stopped in —

at her residence

8 or this trailer as described in Randolph, and then down to
9 Wyoming.
10

If thLe information had of required some sort of

11

subjective reasoning on behalf of the witness, that is the

12

person providing the information, then I think the police

13

officers should have gone into it further.

14

that the police officers were conveying a confession and the

15

facts of that confession, and the fact that they were police

16

officers, and I don't have the case directly at hand, but

17

there is a case which indicates that under certain

18

circumstances the mere fact that it is a police officer

19

relaying the information, that police officer can be assumed

20

to be a reliable witness unless there's some reason why it

21

should not be.

22

find that's the reason why additional information was not

23

required of those witnesses.

24
25

But the mere fact

In this case he is just relaying that.

I

I find that the time frame, from the time that this Orton
provided the information being nearly two months, in this
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1

the Lincoln County sheriff's oJffice when she provided that

2

information.

3

indicates that.

At least there!s nothing in the document which
Mr. Lauritzen has indicated that he's not

4 been able to find any case law which would require that she
5 be Mirandised.

That may be something that the appellate

6 court should look at to give a basis for that, for them to
7

take a look at it.

The court will find, though, for today's

8 purpose I cannot find that she was Mirandised, but I find
9
10
11

that that doesn't make a difference for the purpose of this
search warrant.
Now, also, the order should include that even though the

12

search warrant itself does not indicate -- it troubles me

13

that the search warrant itself does not indicate that it was

14

to be served day time, night time or at any time.

15

was served during the day time, the court does find that that

16

is not a basis to strike.

17

then the court -- the decision of the court here today may be

18

something different.

19

evening, I find that that made no difference whatever to the

20

search warrant.

21

If it was served in the evening,

But where it was not served in the

Now, who would like to prepare the order?

22

MR. LAURITZEN:

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. GREENLIEF:

25

Because it

work on it together.

I will.

Mr. Lauritzen -I was going to suggest we kind of
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THE C O U R T :
speedy d i s p o s a l s

^ 1 some tui\o

Ms.

Dable, yo ; iia/e the right to a
.

*s been pending for

w^,,' ,-;e' ve lust set nere i -. 1" w i 1 ] p<?r.H until

1 October.

Are you willing to waive your right for a speedy

2 disposition until that time?
3

THE DEFENDANT:

4

THE COURT:

Yes

Very well.

All right.

Anything else

51 address as relates to Ms. Dable?
MR. LAURITZEN:
71
8

THE COURT:

Not that I can think of.

Any other matters that need to come to

the court's attention today?

9

MR. LAURITZEN:

None that I know of.

10

MR. GREENLIEF:

No.

11

THE COURT:

12 J
13
14
15
16
17
18
19|
20
21
22
23
24
25

Hearing none, we'll be in recess,

(Hearing concluded.)
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Affidavit for Search Warrant, page 2
4.
STATUTORY GROUNDS.
I have probable cause to believe this
property or evidence (check those that apply and fill in blank with
name of crime).
Y

was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed

V has been used or is possessed for the purpose of being
used to commit or conceal the commission of the offense of &/ltnj ;//&/(

5. ATTACHMENTS. The following attachments are incorporated in
this affidavit as though set forth herein:
(list written
informants1 statements, documentary evidence and other exhibits)
Exhibit 1 Exhibit 2 Exhibit 3 Exhibit 4 Exhibit 5 6. NIGHT SEARCH. I have reasonable cause to believe a search is
necessary in the night as follows:
(state why property may be
concealed, damaged, altered or other good reason).

7.
NO KNOCK.
I have
search to be conducted
(state why the object
disposed of or secreted
if notice is given).

the following evidence which allows the
without notice of authority and purpose:
of the search may be quickly destroyed,
or why physical harm my result to a person

AFFIDAVIT for Search Warrant, page 3

8.
ANONYMOu:? L^« • »anonymous informants:

.iic resignations of

rheii l^ieiii-LL-jr xs watnneiu jecause i state why the informant would
be endangered or. his usefulness destroyed if; name was—stated)

AFFIDAVIT for Search Warrant, page 4
9.
RELIABILITY.
I believe the informants named herein to be
reliable for these reasons: (check those that apply)

L

.the following informants made statements against
their penal interest: J^ml %i 0r"fo/\
_the following informants are citizen informers who have no
interest in this matter: (also state which ones are known to you
personally)

/ the following informants are peace officers with the
departments noted: £,*i<CfVi £ccu*h sAeriftj tou^ * tfi»\ C/caL < W ^\U C<*jv\*C

£

.the following informants are reliable because (state the
name of each informant anji facts corroborating his statement or,
previous reliable statements) jft«it Ork»-\ kid vur <v(f,wf YAcf- A< *wi ablf^

AFFIDAVIT for Search Warrant, page 5
10. PROBABLE CAUSE. The following facts establish that probable
cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant:
(state the
specific facts of the case, state how they were observed, state the
date they were observed and the date they were reported to affiant)
(aw> /.ttwytx CaioU ai -Me -frailer McribfJ
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AFFIDAVIT for Search Warrant, page 6.
DATE SIGNED: fy^vJL 7f

JosQ

TIME SIGNED:

Aff iant

Subscribed and sworn to before me this /

Judge

{?\6

//

day of )LKUL^~

, t-99?

Addendum E

2/00
9

Rich Co. Sheriff's Office
Deputy Report

Incident:

Search Warrant.

Location:

Randolph, UT 84064

Page:

Other Information: On June 7, 2000, at around 3:00 P.M., I spoke
Deputy Kim Clark from the Lincoln County Wyoming Sheriff's Office,
ad also spoken to me the day before about a woman named Laura Dable.
e has a trailer on West Park Street in Randolph.
une 6, Officer Clark asked me if our officers could watch for Dable.
aid that they had an informant that told them Dable was going to
n to pick up some Marijuana and Methamphetamine to sell in Lincoln
ty. He felt that they had enough information to make a traffic stop
search the vehicle. We did not see Dable in Randolph that- ftvpnino.
one 7, Officer Clark called to let me know that they had arrested
e. At the time of the arrest, she had approximately 4 ounces of
juana and 8 grams of Metha'mphetamine. They had also found some pay
bs on her f-.hafc liflt-Pd S ^ P rliftnf.a in Randolph. Specifically John
Sddie Cooper. Dable told Officer Kim Clark and Jodie Gardner that
lad bought the drugs in Ogden, and then stopped at her trailer in
Dlph before proceeding to Wyoming.
in April, a man named Threll Orton was arrested in Evanston,
Lng, for selling Methamphetamine and Marijuana. After the arrest
nade by the Wyoming Officers, Officer Wayne Weston and I did a
»nt search on Orton1s house. We found some paraphernalia and
)ximately 14 ounces of Marijuana. Officer Weston and I spoke to
I while he was still in jail. He told me that he had gotten the
imphetamine he sold from a woman in Randolph named Laura. He also
ribed where she live^i. The description fit Laura Dable1 s trailer on
Street. This information seemed consistent with the information I
receiving from Officers Kim Clark and Jodie Gardner. At that time I
led to write a Search Warrant for Dable1s trailer in Randolph.
lse of the lateness of the hour (around 6:00 p.m.), I asked Justice
Judge Ross McKinnon to look over the warrant. I felt there was a
chance that Dable would contact some of the people she had been
.ng with and they would remove the evidence from the trailer if we
t find it first. Judge McKinnon looked over and signed the
int.

the warrant was signed, Officer Mark Lee and I searched the
er. We recovered 19 items. The list is as follows:
baggie with a razer blade and residue from under the living room
table.
white plastic tube with residue from under the living room coffee
ome green organic material (suspected Marijuana) from the glass top
e living room coffee table.
nother white plastic tube with residue inside.
f the living room coffee table.

It was found on the

